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Revenue, efficiency, and equity should be the three main goals
of income tax reform.  Add to those enforceability - which
furthers the other three goals simultaneously.
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the authors, rflect  only their views, and should be used and cited accordingly.  The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the
















































































































dPolac,Pnning,  and Research
Offce of the Vice  Presdet1t
Of all taxes, income taxes are the most difficult  *  Deal with the thorny problem of fringe
to implement.  Developing countries are usually  benefits (which go disproportionately to the
able to generate large amounts of income tax  b-,tter-off employees) by allowing as deductions
revenue only from large corporations or foreign  for the provider only those benefits for which
investments. They are rarely eftective in taxing  t'e  recipients pay tax.
wealthy individuals or small or medium-size
businesses.  *  Require that all nonprofit organizations file
tax returns, and exempt only certain types of
How can income taxes be made more  their income from taxation, to guard against
effecdve in developing countries?  abuse.
Using recent tax reforms in Jamaica, Indo-  *  Develop "presumptive" methods of assess-
nesia, and elsewhere as examples, Gray dis-  ing taxes for groups (small firms and the self-
cusses the pros and cons of specific tax reform  employed) that are difficult to tax.
elements and makes the following suggestions:
Carefully  limit  deductible  expenses  for
* Limit the distinctions between business and  firms to the necessary costs of earning income.
individual income taxes. This has the advantage
of simplicity and avoids an abrupt shift in tax  *  Simplify depreciation rules by avoiding
liability on incorporation.  "fine tuning" of categories or rates.  \s an
alternative,  allow  full writeoff  ("expensing")  of
* As a general  principle,  broaden  the tax base  capital  investment  in the first year,  but disallow
while  keeping  tax rates  low to moderate. Avoid  the deduction  of interest  paid on loans to finance
special  tax incentives  when  possible.  such  investment.
* Tax the full range  of income  under  a coun-  *  Collect  as much  income  tax as possible  on
try's jurisdiction  - taxing residents  on their  both labor and capital  income  through  withhold-
worldwide  income (with a foreign tax credit)  ing and current payments (P.A.Y.E.), but keep
and nonresidents on all income eamed in the  the procedures simple.
country. This helps to close a wide loophole for
tax avoidance.  *  Enforce tax compliance by charging reason-
able interest and penalties on late payments.
* Include all types of interest income in the  Seizure and auction of propeny and/or criminal
tax base, including interest on bank deposits and  penalties may also be necessary to enforce
govemment bonds.  compliance.  However, these enforcement tools
need to be counterbalanced by fair avenues for
* Fully tax capital gains (particularly under a  taxpaycr objections and appeals.
flat-rate or nearly flat-ratc income tax).
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During  the  1980s,  the  World  Bank  has  become  increasingly  involved
in issues  of fiscal  policy  as  part  of Its  adjustment:  lending. The  bulk
of this  involvement  has  been in the  exploration  of  macroeconomic  issues
of  public  finance  and  the  close  scrutiny  of expenditure  plans  and
budgets  through  public  investment  and  expenditure  reviews. Although  the
Bank  has often  stressed  the  need  to increase  public  revenues,  Bank  staff
working  on adjustment  programs  have tended  to  be less  involved  in
detailed  analysis  of revenue  options. Interest  in  revenue  options  is
growing,  however,  as indicated  by recent  Bank  reviews  of tax  systems  in
Bangladesh,  China,  Malawi,  Morocco,  and  Turkey. Given  the  fiscal
dilemmas  faced  by many  of the  Bank's  borrowers,  there  is little  doubt
that  issues  of revenue  mobilization  are  crucial  to economic  adjustment
and  will continue  to  be for  years  to  come.
Of all  the  types  of taxes,  income  taxes--particularly  on
individuals  and  small  businesses--are  the  most  difficult  to implement
efficiently.  Developing  countries  tend  to  be successful  at generating
large  amounts  of income  tax  revenue  only  from  large  corporations  or
foreign  investments.  They  are  rarely  effective  in taxing  wealthy
individuals  or small  and  middle-sized  businesses.  How can  the
effectiveness  of income  taxes  be improved  in  developing  countries?
This  paper  attempts  to  acquaint  the  reader  with  common  issues  in
the  design  of income  taxes  in  developing  countries,  and  to suggest
(where  possible)  the  "best  practice"  for  addressing  these  issues. Two
recent  comprehensive  income  tax  reforms--in  Jamaica  and Indonesia--
provide  helpful  illustrations,  and limited  reforms  in  other  countries
provide .urther  examples  in selected  areas.2
GOALS.
The  three  main  goals  of income  tax  reform  are  revenue,  efficiency,
and  equity. Often  these  goals  are  mutually  reinforcing,  but  at times
they  are  not.  The  goals  of any  attempt  at reform  should  be clearly
defined,  in  order  of priority  if  possible.
The immediate  need  for  more  revenue  is  obvious  in countries  with
significant  budget  deficits. Other  countries  may  not  have acute  revenue
problems  but  may seek  higher  elasticity  in their  income  taxes  to insure
that  the  tax  to  GDP ratio  rises--or  at least  does  not  fall--over  time.
Still  others  may  want to increase  income  tax  revenues  to  offset  revenue
losses  from  other  structural  reforms. Unfortunately,  short-term  revenue
pressure  can  lead  to  changes  that  are  counterproductive  in the  longer-
run.  Long-term  improvements  in  income  tax  design  rarely  occur  in times
of  budgetary  crisis.
With regard  to  efficiency,  the  goal  of income  tax  reform  should  be
to  minimize  the  effect  of taxes  on ecor,omic  behaviour,  including
savings,  investment,  production,  and  individual  work.  In general,
higher  marginal  tax  rates  lead  to larger  economic  distortions,  so that
simply  raising  tax  rates  to increase  revenue  conflicts  with the  goal  of
efficiency. Care  in  defining  the  tax  base,  setting  the  tax  rates,  and
designing  the  rules  regarding  the  taxation  of savings  income  and  capital
write-off  car  reduce  the  effect  of taxes  on  economic  behavior. 1
1  Public  finance  literature  makes  a strong  case,  primarily on
efficiency  grounds  but to some  extent  on grounds  of simplicity  as well,
for  replacing  an income  tax  with  a direct  "consumption"  or "expenditure"
tax.  Such  a tax  would  tax  only  consumption  and  exempt  the  returns  to
savings,  thereby  eliminating  the  income  tax's  inherent  bias  against
savings  (i.e.  future  consumption)  in favor  of present  consumption. See,
among  others,  Andrews  (1974),  Pechman  (1980),  and  Zodrow  and  McClure
(1988). While  the  idea  of an expenditure  tax  has  many attractive3
Equity  is  an oft-cited  goal  of an income  tax.  In fact,  if  equity
were  not  an issue,  one  might  question  having  an income  tax  at all,  given
the  relative  administrative  convenience  and  nondistortionary  character
oi  broad-based  domestic  sales  taxes. Income  taxes  are  considered
desirable  in large  part  because  their  burden  is  related  to ability  to
pay.
In industrial  countries  with  strong  tax  enforcement  mechanisms,
the  goal  of equity  often  conflicts  with the  other  two  goals. For
example,  a flattening  of the  income  tax  rate  schedule,  as occurred  in
the  1986  U.S. tax  reform,  tenTds  to  lessen  distortions  but can  &iso
reduce  progressivity.  The conflict  can  also  arise  in developing
countries. Raising  withholding  rates  on wage-earners  is a  way to
increase  income  tax  revenues  quickly  in  developing  countries,  but the
burden  is  heaviest  on the  middle  class  rather  than  the  richest  segments
of the  population.
These  conflicts  between  goals  tend  to  be less  severe  in  developing
countries,  however;  in  many cases  all  three  goals  can  be furthered
simultaneously  by strengthening  tax  enforcement  and  compliance. Income
tax  laws  in  developing  countries  may impose  high  marginal  tax  rates--
usually  reaching  60 percent  arn  sometimes  as  high as 95  percent,  but in
practice  they  are  rareLy  applied  anywhere  near  to  potential. 2 Because
the  easiest  income  taxes  to  collect  tend  to  be individual  income  taxes
features,  it  has  not  yet  been accepted  in  practice. This  paper  focuses
on the  income  tax,  which--for  better  or  worse--is  and  will  probably
continue  to  be the  norm in  both developed  and  developing  countries  for
some  time  to come.
2  For  example,  an internal  study  in Indonesia  in  the  early  1980s
estimated  that  only  10 to 20  percent  of potential  income  tax  revenues
were actually  collected  prior  to the  reform. A similar  study  in  Jamaica
estimated  that  over  one-half  of all  potentially  taxable  income  was
outside  the incr--e  tax  net.  Bahl  and  Murray,  p. 5.4
on employees  and  company  income  taxes  on foreign  companies  and  state-
owned  enzerprises,  che  wealthiest  individuals  often  escape  much  of the
tax  burden. Simplifying  the  income  tax  structure  and  narrowing  its
scope  in order  to  make ic  easier  to administer  and  enforce  can  lead  over
time  to increased  revenues,  efficiency,  and  equity  in an income  tax
system. For  this  reason,  enforceability  should  be counted  as a fourth
major  goal  of income  tax  roform  in  developing  countries.
THE  DEFINITION OF TAXPAYER.
Domestic  Coveraze.
Ideally  the  definition  of taxpayer  is  as  broad  as  possible,
covering  all  income  earning  entities  (individuals,  partnerships,  and
companies).3 For  example,  the  public  gecror  need  not  be exempted;
state-owned  enterprises  should  be on the  same  footing  as  private  firms,
and  civil  servants  should  be the  first--not  the  last--to  pay  tax. 4 Ex-
ante  exemptions  for  other  large  sectors  of society,  such  as
agriculture,5  are  also  usually  ill-advised.  They  open  up scope  for  tax
evasion  and  abuse. Poor  farmers  will  be exempted  through  the  workings
3  Even though  the  burden  of all forms  of income  taxation  ultimately
falls  on individuals,  corporations  and  other  income-earning  entities
should  be included  in the  tax  net. As legal  entities,  they  receive
benefits  from  the  stare. And  as repositories  of large  amounts  of income
with  accompanying  records,  they  are  easier  to tax  than  individuals.
4  Some  countries,  including  Bangladesh  and  Indonesia  (prereform),  have
treated  salaries  of government  officials  as if taxes  had  alreaay  been
withheld  at source  (although  no such  withholding  was  actually  calculated
and  paid)  and  therefore  have  exempted  them  from  further  tax.  This
treatmenc  is inefficient,  because  government  agencies  are  given  a
competitive  advantage  in the  labor  market  vis-a-vis  private  firms. It
is  also inequitable,  because  higher-level  civil  servants  are  not forced
to aggregate  their  employment  income  with other  income  in  calculating
tax  due. Under  the  new Indonesian  law,  civil  servants  are legally
liable  for  income  tax,  and  government  agencies  are  responsible  for
withholding  in the  same  way  as private  firms  are.
5  As is  Pakistan  and  Morocco.5
of the  personal  exemption;  wealthy  farmers  should  pay  tax.  Even  many
charitable  organizations  need  not  be exempt  from  income  tax  ex-ante.  In
an atmosphere  with weak  admiuistrativ.e  capability,  profitable  business
activities  can  easily  hide  behind  t1r'  'charitnblel  characterization.
Income  earned  specifically  frot  charitable  activities  can  be effectively
exempted  through  the  definition  of taxable  income 6 rather  than  the
definition  of taxpayer.
In  most  countries  two  separate  income  tax  regimes  coexist,  one for
businesses  and  one for  individuals.  Each  has its  own  rules  for
determining  taxable  income  and its  owr.  rate  structure.  Most revenue
tends  to come  from  the  business  income  tax, 7 which  is  easier  to enforce
(especially  for  medium  and  large  firms). Specifying  the  dividing  line
between  the  two  regimes  can  bi problematic.  Questions  such  as these
must  be faced: Should  the  business  tax  apply  to  unincorporated  firms
such  as partnerships  or only  to  corporations?  If it  applies  only  to the
latter,  why  should  the  mere act  of incorporation  throw  a business  into  a
completely  separate  tax  regime? If it  applies  to  unincorporated  firms
as  well,  where  do individual  entreprene."rs  fit? Does the  business  tax
cover  small  family-run  businesses  such  as  restaurants,  or do these  fall
under  the  individual  income  tak  law?
Many countries  draw  the  dividing  line  between  the  application  of
individual  and  business  income  tax  laws  at the  point  of incorporation,
arguing  that  having  the  corporate  form  confers  certain  legal  advantages
that  offset  the %ax  conssquences.  Other  countries  try  to  cover  all
firms--in^i:o  'ioted  or nDt-with their  b..s't.Ifss  tax  law,  leaving  the
dividing  !  -Lr.  etween  firm3a  end indiv'.duals  rather  ad  hoc.  Indonesia's
6  See  pp. 17-l6  below.
7  World  DeveloRwtme  Report  1983,  p. 84.1983  income  tax  reform  addr  ised  t:be  problem  by applying  virtually  the
same  tax  treatment  (with  t:',  samae  ws,finition  of tax  base and  the  same
rate  structure)  to  both  businesses  and individuals.  The  new income  tax
law  applies  to  all individuals  and  business  entities,  with the  only
major  dffference  in the  method  of calculating  tax  for  the  two  groups
being  the  personal  exemptions  granted  to individuals  but  not to
corporations  or  partnerships. 8 Jamaica  and the  Phillipines  also  moved
recently  to similar  treatment  of  businesses  and individuals--with  the
same  marginal  tax  rates  (33  1/3  and  35  percent,  respectively)  applied  to
each.  This  approach  has the  advantages  of simplicity  and relative
certainty,  and it  avoids  an  abrupt  shift  in  tax  liability--and  any
resulting  distortionary  effects--upon  incorporation.  These  advantages
must  be weighed  in  each individual  case  against  the  elexibility  and




Under  generally  accepted  international  tax  principles,  a country's
jurisdiction  to tax  extends  to  all income  earned  within  its  borders  and
all income  earned  outside  its  borders  by its  residents. Some  developing
countries,  including  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Ecuador,  and  Taiwan,  have
limited  their  tax  net  to income  earned  within  their  borders,  opting  not
to tax  foreign-source  income  of residents. Such  a limitation  can  lead
to  major  tax  avoidance,  however,  because  wealthy  citizens  can  easily
transfer  money  to overseas  tax-free  accounts. An alternative  is  to
8  See  page  29  below  tor  a discussion  of  personal  exemptions. rhe  only
sector  of the  economy  explicitly  exempted  from  the  application  of the
new  Indonesian  income  tax  is the  oil  sector,  which  is taxed  iT:stead
under  other  government  regulations  and  production-sharing  contracts.7
impose  tax  on the  full  range  of income  subject  to a country's
jurisdiction,  taxing  residents  on their  worldwide  income  (with  a foreign
tax  credit)  and  nonresidents  on all  income  earned  in  the  country.
Although  such  a provision  does  not  guarantee  full  taxation  of all
foreign-source  income,  it  does  close  a  wide loophole  for  legal  tex
avoidance.
The  new laws  of  both  Jamaica  and  Indonesia  tax  the  worldwide
income  of residents. In the  case  of Indonesia,  for  example,  it is
extremely  easy  for  Indonesian  residents  to  hold  money  in Singa;ore  bank
accounts  or other  financial  assets. If  only  domestic  source  income  were
taxed,  tranferring  assets  to  Singapore  (where  foreign  bank accounts  are
untaxed)  would  provide  a fully  legal  means  to  avoid  taxes. Taxing
foreign  source  income  of residents  may  not  stop tax  evasion  through
capital  flight,  but it does  close  an obvious  legal  loophole.
The  definition  of resident.
How  should  a tax  law  define  resident  for  tax  purposes? The
resident/nonresident  distinction  is an important  one,  for  residents  are
taxed  entirely  differently  from  nonresidents.  Generally  residents  are
defined  to include  anyone  intending  to  reside  indefinitely  in a country
or anyone  who in fact  stays  in  a country  over  a particular  length  of
time (typically  six  months). In the  case  of  business  entities,  both
firms  establisheI  ;--der  the  laws  of  a country  and  "permanent
establishments'  of foreign  firms  located  in  the  country  are  usually
taxed  as residentq.  (Permanent  establishments  might  be excluded  from  the
technical  def!.iition  of resident  but taxed  in  the  same  way.)  Taxation
of permatnent  establishments  is  generally  limited  to  worldwide  incomeattributable  to such  establishmerts  and  does  not  reach  unrelated  income
of the  foreign  head office. 9
Source  rules.
How  does  one  kno4 if income  is earned  in the  country  or abroad?
Surprisingly,  this  can  be a tricky  question  in transactions  involving
foreigners.  Manipulating  the  location  where  income  is learned'  can  be a
potent  means  of tax  avoidance. Aside  from  defining  the  reach  of the  tax
net for  various  types  of taxpayers,  an income  tax  law  should  lay  down
clear  "source"  rules--rules  for  determining  the  source  of various  items
of income  and thus  clarifying  what income  of a foreignar  is subject  to
domestic  income  tax  4d  what income  of a resident  is eligibic  for  a
foreign  tax  cre  it.  For  example,  the  "source"  of interest,  dividends,
and  royalties  is  usually  considered  to  be  where  the  payor (whether
business  or individual)  resides. The source  of income  (including
capital  gains)  from  immovable  property  is typically  where  the  property
is located. The  source  of payments  for  personal  services  is  generally
considered  to be  where  the  services  are  performed. Some  countries
extend  this  reach  to include  services  performed  abroad  but  paid for  by
residents  (and  thus  easily  subject  to  withholding);  however,  such  an
extension  is often  not  matched  by the  tax  treatment  of the  same  income
abroad  and  can  lead  to  double  taxation  of the  income.
THE  CONCEPT  OF INCOME.
General  definition.
Old-style  schedular  tax  systems  tended  to  have  relatively  narrow
definitions  of taxable  income,  omitting  taxpayers  and  income  not
9  See  page 14  below.9
specifically  named. Salaries  would  be subject  to  one  rate,  business
income  to  another,  capital  income  to  yet another,  and  so on until  the
categories  were  exhaust-d. Some  types  of income  were left  out
altogether. For  example,  the  old  Moroccan  income  tax  law  imposed
separate  schedules--with  different  rates  and  rules  for  calculating  the
tax  base--for  wages  and  salaries,  agricultural  income,  urban  real
property  income,  dividend  and interest  income,  business  profits,  and
capital  gains.
The  current  trend  in income  tax  reform  is to  define  income  as
broadly  as possible  to reach  a truly  "global"  income  tax. The  general
definition  is  all-inclusive--income  is "any  increase  in economic
prosperity'  or 'any  net  addition  to  wealth"  received  by a taxpayer.
Starting  with such  a general  definition  provides  the  tax  authorities
with a strong  legal  tool  to  combat  tax  evasion. Of course,  numerous
questions  inevitably  arise  when individual  cases  are  considered. Some
of the  more  controversial  issues  are  considered  below.
Interest  income.
Among  the  most  controversial  issues  that  can  arise  in income
taxation  is  how to  treat  interest  income,  particularly  interest  earned
on domestic  bank  deposits. Policy  makers  often  fear  that  taxing
interest,  by lowering  the  return  on savings,  could  have  a negative
impact  on  domestic  savings  and  could  encourage  capital  flight. Much
depends  on the  structure  of the  financial  system  and  the  institutional
mechanism  for  setting  interest  rates. To the  extent  interest  rates  are
free  to  move in  response  to  market  forces,  any  tax  on interest  will  be
borne  in  part  by borrowers  through  higher  bank lending  rates. In  such
case,  the  incentive  to  move  funds  out  of domestic  banks  will  be10
lessened. (There  will  of course  be a cost  at the  margin  in terms  of
foregone  investment  due  to the  higher  lending  rates.) If interest  rates
are  controlled,  the  tax  will  be  borne  fully  by depositors. Even  then,
term  deposits  may  not  be very  responsive  to  changes  in  after-tax
interest  rates,  especially  in low  income  countries  and  for  small
depositors  in  most countries. And  to the  extent  bank  deposits  are
"captive'--for  example,  owned  by state-owned  enterprises  required  to
keep their  deposits  at  home--they  will  not  be affected  at all  by changes
in  after-tax  interest  rates.
Strong  arguments--along  efficiency,  equity,  revenue,  and  tax
administration  grounds--can  be made  in favor  of including  all  categories
of interest  income  in the  tax  base.  First,  exemption  of certain
categories  of savings  acts to  discriminate  artificially  against  others
to the  extent  the  latter  are taxed. Exemption  of  bank deposit  interest,
for  example,  can  put  stocks,  bonds,  promissory  notes,  and  other
nonexempt  savings  vehicles  at  a competitive  disadvantage  and inhibit  the
development  of a mature  and  diversified  financial  system. Furthermore,
exemption  of interest  on government  bonds  tends  not only  to favor  this
form  of saving  artificially  but also  to  obscure  the  true  economic  cost
of public  deficits;  government  agencies  are  not  forced  to  pay the  same
return  on  borrowed  money  that  their  private  counterparts  would.
Second,  interest  income  is  earned  overwhelmingly  by persons  in
higher  income  brackets,  and  thus  the  exemption  of interest  generally  has
a regressive  impact  on the  distribution  of the  total  tax  burden. This
is  ameliorated  if the  exemption  is limited  either  to  savings  channels
traditionally  used  only  by small  savers--as,  for  example,  in  Korea--or
to interest  income  below  a  modest  limit--as,  for  example,  in  Jamaica.11
Finally,  an exemption  for  interest  can  be very  costly  in revenue
terms. A tax  on  bank deposits  is  easy  to implement  through  withholding
and  can  raise  large  amounts  of revenue. Even  more importantly,  such  an
exemption  opens  an enormous  loophole  for  tax  avoidance  as long  as
interest  paid in  the  course  of  business  is  considered  a deductible
expense  for  the  payer. A taxpayer  can  reduce  tax  liability  at  will  by
borrowing  to finance  operating  costs  while  depositing  savings  in  a tax-
free  account. These  savings  can  be used  as collateral  for  the  loan,
thus  eliminating  any  risk  to the  lender. 10
Both the  Jamaican  and  the  Indonesian  income  tax  reforms  brought
interest  income,  which  had  previously  been excluded,  into  the  tax  net.
In the  Indonesian  case,  such  taxation  was  suspended  by supplemental
regulation,  in  large  part  due  to fear  of  capital  flight,  and  full
taxation  of interest  was  not  actually  realized  until  late  1988.
Capital  gains.
Taxes  on capital  gains  are  very  difficult  to administer  and
enforce  even  in industrial  countries,  and  they  are  notoriously
problematic  ir.  developing  countries.  However,  excluding  capital  gains
from  the  tax  net  opens  up  major  avenues  for  tax  avoidance. In  developed
countries  (such  as Australia  and  the  United  States)  that  have in the
10  For  example,  assume  bank  deposit  interest  is  tax  free,  while  other
types  of interest  are  taxable  and interest  is  a deductible  expense  for
the  borrower. Further  assume  a marginal  tax  rate  of 33 1/3  percent.
Company  A can  deposit  $1  billion  in  Bank  B at 10  percent  interest  (tax
free)  and  borrow  $1  billion  from  Company  C at a deductible  cost  of 12
percent. Bank  B can  indirectly  finance  this  loan  by using  A's deposit
as collateral  for  a $1  billion  loan  to  C at 12  percent  interest
(presumably  taxable  to the  bank). The  net  result  of this  "sham"
triangular  arrangement  will  be a 2  percent  before-tax  profit  margin  (12
percent  minus  10  percent)  by Bank  B, no gain  or loss  to  Company  C, and
an after-tax  gain  to  Company  A of 2  percent  (10  percent  minus  8  percent,
because  of the  deductibility  of interest  paid)  of the  $1  billion. The
only  loser  will  be the  government.12
past fully  or largely  excmpted  capital  gains  from  tax,  many  schemes  have
been invented  for  converting  ordinary  income  into  capital  gains. For
example,  rather  than  carry  out  a large  sale  of inventory  directly
(ordinary  income),  a separate  company  can  be formed  with  such  inventory
as its  assets,  and  the  company  can  be sold  (capital  gain). Or rather
than  distribute  cash  dividends  (ordinary  income),  stock  dividends  can  be
issued  on a pro-rata  basis,  and  the  stock  can  first  be sold  by the
shareholders  (capital  gain)  and  then  redeemed  by the  company  at face
value.  Developing  country  taxpayers  would  undoubtedly  begin  to  discover
such  schemes  over  time  if  capital  gains  were  exempt  from  tax. And
efforts  to plug  those  loopholes  would  only  further  complicate  tax  law,
as they  have in industrial  countries.
Taxing  capital  gains  in full  is  not as  problematic  under  a flat-
rate  or nearly  flat-rate  tax  as  under  a tax  with steeply  progressive
rates,  because  the  flat  rate  lessens  the  problem  of "bunching". 11 The
tax incurred  on the  gain  will  be the  same  no matter  when it  is realized.
If  the  realization  of a large  gain  does  propel  a taxpayer  into  a  higher
rate  bracket,  the "excess"  burden  can  be relieved  by treating  only  a
fraction  of the  gains  (particularly  longer-term  gains)  as income  or  by
breaking  the  gain  up into  annual  increments  and  applying  an average
effective  rate to  each  increment. 12 The  latter  approach  is  being
followed  in Indonesia,  where  capital  gains  are  fully  taxable. Capital
11  "Bunching"  refers  to the  problem  cau.sed  in a  progressive  tax  system
when  a large  capital  gain  earned  over  several  years  is realized  in the
final  year,  thus  pushing  the  taxpayer  to  a  higher  tax  bracket  than
normal.
12  Virtually  all  countries  that  tax  capital  gains  do so  on a
realization  basis (i.e.  when  the  gains  are  realized  through  transfer),
because  of the  administrative  difficulty  of taxing  such  gains  as they
accrue. A mildly  progressive  tax  might  be justified  because  it
counteracts  the  built-in  incentive  for  taxpayers  to  defer  realization
and  thereby  postpone  tax  liability.13
gains  are  not taxed  under  the  income  tax  in  Jamaica,  but a separate  tax
of 7.5  percent  of total  receipts  (or  a  maximum  of 37.5  percent  of the
gain)  applies  on the  transfer  of land  and  buildings.
Fringe  benefits.
The taxation  of fringe  benefits  can  be a thorny  technical  and
political  problem. Large  firms  in  developing  countries  often  provide
such  benefits  as  housing,  automobiles,  travel,  and  medical  benefits  to
their  employees,  either  in  kind  or  as money  allowances. Exempting  them
from  tax  gives  a strong  incentive  to  provide  more income  in the  form  of
fringe  benefits,  thus  eroding  the  tax  base. 13 A typical  method  of
handling  fringe  benefits  is to  treat  them  as a deductible  expense  to the
provider  and  as income  to the  recipient. This  method  was  adopted,  for
example,  in the  recent  Jamaican  income  tax  reform. While  in theory  this
is  reasonable,  in  practice  these  benefits--particularly  if  provided  in
kind--can  be very difficult  to identify  and  value  and  are  thus  generally
taxed  lightly  if  at all.
Another  way of  handling  in-kind  fringe  benefits  (adopted  in
Indonesia)  is to disallow  any  deduction  to the  provider  while  exempting
such income  from  tax in  the  hands  of the  recipient. Under  such  a
system,  if  a company  wants  to deduct  wages  and  salaries  paid to
employees  in  calculating  taxable  income,  such  wages  and  salaries  must  by
law  be paid in  money  rather  than  in-kind. This rule  in effect  taxes
fringe  benefits  at the  marginal  tax  rate  of the  company,  which  may  be
lower  or higher  than  the  marginal  rate  of the  taxpayer. To the  extent
it is  easier  to  enforce  than  a tax  on fringe  benefits  in the  hands  of
13  Two  examples  of countries  that  have  exempted  such  fringe  benefits
from  taxation  are  Jamaica  (pre-reform)  and  Bangladesh. Before  the
Jamaican  tax  reform,  nontaxable  allowances  had grown  to an  estimated  40
percent  of taxable  wages.14
the  recipient,  the  revenue  impact  may  well  be positive. Furthermore,
because  fringe  benefits  tend  to  go disproportionately  to  the  better-off
employees,  the  rule  is  likely  to further  equity  goals  as compared  to a
system  where  fringe  benefits  are  taxed  little  or  not at all. While
narrowing  a  well-known  tax  loophole,  such  a rule  stimulates  a trend
toward  money  wages  away from  less  transparent  in-kind  payments.
Income  of Permanent  Establishments.
As mentioned  earlier,  a foreign  firm  operating  in  a country  is
generally  taxable  on the  income  attributable  to such  operations. This
is  done  by considering  "permanent  establishments"  of foreign  firms--i.e.
branches,  representative  offices,  construction  sites,  etc.--to  be
residents  of the  country  for  tax  purposes,  or by taxing  them  as
residents  even  if they  are  not  legally  defined  as such.  If the  country
taxes  the  worldwide  income  of its  residents,  permanent  establishments
can  similarly  be taxed  on  any  worldwide  income  attributable  to them,  and
remittances  from  a  permanent  establishment  to  a head  office  abroad  can
be subject  to t..e  same  withholding  tax  as that  applied  to remittances  of
dividends  from  a local  subsidiary  to a foreign  parent  firm.  Income  of
the  multinational  firm  earned  in  other  countries  without  the  assistance
of the  local  branch  would  not,  however,  be attributed  to such  branch.
A broad  definition  of attributable  income  can  help to close
loopholes  for  evasion  of tax  by foreign  corporations.  Such  a definition
would  not only  include  any income  arising  directly  out  of the  operations
of the  permanent  establishment,  including  income  on sales  made  by the
branch  abroad,  but it  would  also  incorporate  the  "force  of attraction"
principle;  this  would  bring  into  the  tax  net  of a permanent
establishment  any  income  from  activities  carried  on in the  country  by15
the  head office  or a related  company  of a type  similar  to the  activities
normally  carried  on  by the  branch  itself. For  example,  if the  branch  is
in the  business  of selling  shoes,  profits  made  from  shipments  of  shoes
by the  head office  directly  to  local  customers  would  be automatically
attributed  to the  branch,  even if  it took  no official  part in the  sale.
Thus,  tax  could  not  be avoided  simply  by bypassing  the  branch  in a
particuiar  sale.
flnc-e  of Foundations  and  Cooperatives.
Because  of the  potential  for  abuse  and  tax  evasion,  tax  laws  must
be carefully  worded  when exempting  "nonprofit"  groups  and/or
cooperatives  from  income  taxation. Many profitable  activities
masquerade  as  nonprofit  or cooperative  ones in  order  to escape  the  tax
net.  Even  if governments  want to support  public  interest  activities,  it
may  be desirable  to include  foundations  and  cooperatives  as taxpayers.
A  specific  exemption  can  then  be granted  for  certain  types  of income--
for  example,  for:
-income  earned  by a foundation  from  activities  exclusively  in the
public  interest,
-other  income  of such  foundation  (such  as  dividends)  if  used  to
fund  public  interest  activities,  and
-income  of a cooperative  if  derived  from  service  to its  members
(or  if  distributed  to its  members,  if distribution  of profits  is
the  principle  goal).
Such  treatment  would  increase  the  accountability  of these  organizations
by requiring  that  they  file  regular  tax  returns  and  by increasing  the
likelihood  that  they  would  occasionally  be audited. It  would  guard
against  abuse  by including  in the  tax  net  most regular  commercial
activities  unrelated  to the  foundation's  or the  cooperative's  public
interest  mission.16
Income  of "Hard  to  Tax"  GrouRs.
A major  problem  with income  taxation  in developing  countries  is
the  lack  of complete  and  reliable  books  and  records  among  many
taxpayers,  particularly  small  and  medium-sized  businesses  and
professionals.  For  example,  a study  in  Jamaica  es:,imated  that  the  self-
employed  as a sector  paid taxes  equivalent  to  only  3.7  percent  of their
earnings  in 1983,  well  below  the  42.5  percent  legally  due. 14  Any
attempt  to apply  a complex  income  tax  to  these  taxpayers  is likely  to
result  in  a tax  that  is  arbitrary  and  open  to "negotiation".  Yet these
"hard-to-tax"  groups  still  need  to  be reached  if  the  tax  burden  is to  be
distributed  fairly  across  the  population.
Many  countries,  including  not only  low-income  countries  but  also
middle-  and  high-income  countries  such  as  Korea  and  Japan,  have resorted
to  methods  of "presumptive'  taxation  to assess  these  taxpayers. Such
methods  rely  more  or less  on industry-specific  norms  rather  than
individual  books  of account  to  estimate  taxable  income. The  new
Indonesian  income  tax  law,  for  example,  allows  any  business  with annual
turnover  less  than  a certain  fixed  amount  to  choose  to  be taxed  based  on
published  "assessment  guides"  rather  than  an individualized  calculation
of taxable  profit. Such  a taxpayer  needs  only  to  keep  a record  of gross
turnover,  and  guides  are  used to  determine  taxable  income. Turkey  also
recently  introduced  a system  of  presumptive  taxation  for  workers  in
agriculture,  trade,  and  the  professions.  Under  the  "Living  Standard
Assessment  System",  a  base income  is  presumed,  and  certain  amounts  of
additional  income  are  assumed  to  be associated  with  such  personal
characteristics  as ownership  of  houses,  cars,  boats,  airplanes,  and  race
14  Bahl  and  Murray,  p. 19.17
horses,  employment  of personal  servants,  and  foreign  travel. The
presumed  income  sets  a floor,  so that  tax  is assessed  on the  greater  of
presumed  or declared  income.
These  methods  can  help to reduce  discretion  and  bargaining  and  to
ration  scarce  administrative  resources  in  a developing  country
environment. To  be as fair  and  reliable  as  possible,  any  system  of
presumptive  taxation  should  have  a clear  legal  basis,  and  should  be
based  on careful  study  of industry  standards. Each  guide  would  need to
be adjusted  from  time  to time  to  maintain  accuracy.
DEDUCTIONS  FROM  INCOME.
To broaden  the  tax  base,  an expansive  definition  of taxable  income
should  be accompanied  by a careful  limitation  of deductible  expenses.
The  necessary  costs  of earning  income--including  materials,  wages  and
salaries,  honoraria,  interest,  rent,  royalties,  travel  costs,  bad debts,
administrative  costs,  and  taxes  other  than  income  taxes--are  in general
deductible  in determining  the  taxable  income  of firms. If a country
wants  to avoid  the  double  taxation  of dividend  income  (i.e.,  to
"integrate"  corporate  and  personal  taxes),  dividends  paid  to
shareholders  can  also  be exempt  from  tax  at the  corporate  level,  or the
shareholder  can  be given  a  credit  for  the  taxes  paid  on the  dividend
income  at the  corporate  level. The  latter  is  done,  for  example,  in
Malawi. Alternatively  and  perhais  preferably  from  an administrative
perspective,  dividends  can  be exempt  from  tax  in  the  hands  of the
recipient,  as is done  in  Turkey. If dividends  are  not  exempt  from
15 tax,  certain  other  payments  should  also  be disallowed  as deductions,
15  For  revenue  and  equity  reasons,  both Indonesia  and  Jamaica  decided
to  maintain  the  double  taxation  of dividends.18
including  expenses  incurred  for  the  benefit  of shareholders  and
excessive  compens&tion  paid  to employees  who are  also shareholders,  both
of  which  constitute  "disguised  dividends".
Other  types  of exper.ditures  that  can  well  be disallowed  as
deductions  in the  interest  of simplicity  and  enforceability  are  fringe
benefits  (as  discussed  earlier),  gifts  and  bequests,16  and  charitable
contributions. 17 If they  sre  not  allowed  as deductions,  they  should  not
be taxable  to the  recipient. In all  three  cases,  the  expenses  are  not
necessary  for  business  purposes  and  allowing  deductibility  (whether  for
firms  or individuals)  can  open  serious  loopholes  for  tax  evasion  and
avoidance.
Some  countries  grant  special  exemptions  and  deductions  to
individuals  depending  on their  particular  profession. For  example,
although  the  new  Moroccan  individual  income  tax  is assessed  on global
income  (replacing  the  previous  schedular  system),  it grants  deductions
of from  17 to  45 percent  of salary  income  of certain  professions  (the
rate  depending  on the  profession  concerned)  for  costs  "inherent  in
employment".  These  profession-specific  deductions  mean that  different
sources  of income  are  effectively  taxed  at different  rates,  and  the
problems  inherent  in a schedular  tax  system  emerge.
16  A country  may  want to impose  a separate  gift  tax if  it also  has an
inheritance  tax. Without  an equivalent  gift  tax,  people  would  give  away
their  assets  before  death  to avoid  inheritance  tax.
17  Charitable  contributions  are  not deductible  in  Indonesia. They  are
deductible,  to a  maximum  of 5  percent  of taxable  income,  in  Jamaica.19
Pensions  and  Life  Insurance.
Although  private  pensions  and  life  insurance  plans  are  not  as
comm.nly  used for  individual  long-term  saving  in developing  countries  as
they  are  in industrial  countries,  they  are  growing  in  use  as financial
systems  grow  in  complexity  and  sophistication.  Tax  policy  need  not
necessarily  stimulate  their  growth  through  highly  preferential
treatment,  especially  considering  that  high-income  groups  are  the  most
likely  to have  access  to them.  However,  it  can facilitate  their  growth
by avoiding  any  artificial  barriers  to their  use.
To facilitate  the  use  of pension  plans,  both  employee  and  employer
contributions  can  be allowed  as  deductions,  with  employer  contributions
not taxed  as income  to the  employee. (If  pension  benefits  are  not  yet
vested,  such  contributions  do  not "belong"  to the  employee  anyway.)
Pension  funds  may then  be exempt  from  tax  on income  they  accrue. The
payouts  of  pension  benefits  should  then  be fully  taxable  when  paid to
the  extent  they  exceed  the  personal  exemption.
Whole  life  and  endowment  insurance  policies  involve  a significant
savings  element  (when  comipared  to term  insurance),  and  they  can
substitute  for  pension  plans  as vehicles  for  providing  funds  for
retirement.  However,  in  practice  it is  difficult  to tax  rroceeds  of
life  insurance  policies  paid at the  time  of death  of the  insured.
Rather  than  allowing  a deduction  for  premium  payments  and taxing
payouts,  the  same  economic  effect  can  result  if  premiums  are  not
deductible  (whether  paid  by an individual  or  by a  company  on behalf  of
an employee),  but neither  the  proceeds  nor the  build-up  of savings  in
the  life  insurance  reserve  fund  is taxable. This  tax treatment  was
chosen,  for  example,  in the  Indonesian  tax  reform. The  time  of the  tax20
is  different  from  that  for  pensions,  but the  present  value  of the  tax
take  remains  the  same.
Depreciation.
The  standard  way  of handling  capital  investment  for  income  tax
purposes  is to  allow  a firm  to  depreciate  that  investment  over  several
years. Such  depreciation  can  be on a straight-line  or declining  balance
basis,  or it  can  be accelerated--as  is  often  done for  "favored'
investments.  An alternative,  widely  discussed  in the  literature  but
rarely  applied  in  practice, 18 is  to allow  full  writeoff  ("expensing")  of
investment  in the  first  year,  while  disallowing  the  deduction  of
interest  paid  on  borrowing  to  finance  such  investment.  Such  treatment
is  often  favored  by economists  because  it implies  a zero  marginal
effective  tax  rate  on investment. 19 It  would  also  be relatively  easy  to
administer  once  put into  place,  and  it  would  tend  to  avoid  distortions
caused  by inflation. However,  critics  claim  that  the  transition  costs
of switching  to such  a system  could  be large. They could  include
significant  revenue  losses  in  the  early  years  of introduction,  when
revenue-generation  is often  of prime  concern. Furthermore,  the
nondeductibility  of interest  that  should  accompany  expensing  could
initially  be opposed  by businesses,  who  might  not  understand  the  theory
18  Full  expensing  exists  for  some  favored  investments  in Bangladesh.
The idea  was  recently  rejected  in  Turkey,  Indonesia,  and  Jamaica.
19  Why a zero  marginal  effective  tax  rate? With  full  expensing,  the
government  in essence  becomes  a full  partner  in the  venture. The
government  "pays"  (through  the  tax  deeuction)  a certain  portion  of the
investment  (the  portion  being  determined  by the  marginal  tax  rate)  and
earns  a "return"  through  taxes  charged  on later  profits  on that
investment.  The  profits  earned  on the  investor's  "share"  of the
investment  (the  share  being  1  minus  the  marginal  tax  rate)  are  in
essence  tax-free. A zero  METR  does  not  imply  a zero  average  tax  rate.
The  average  tax  rate  can  still  be positive  because  taxes  continue  to  be
charged  on any  remaining  ("inframarginal")  returns  from  previous
investment.  For  a thorough  explanation  of this  approach,  see  Zodrow  and
McClure  (1988).21
behind  it  and tend  to  view interest  as a significant  cost  of doing
business. In  addition,  such  nondeductibility  would  need to  be
accompanied  by tax-free  treatment  of interest  in the  hands  of the
recipient. Critics  do  not  believe  that  financial  institutions--whose
income  is  primarily  in  the  form  of interest--should  largely  if  not  fully
escape  the  corporate  tax  net. 20
A major  objective  for  developing  countries  in designing  a system
of depreciation  should  be to  keep it simple. For  example,  efforts  at
"fine-tuning"  depreciation  by using  a large  number  of categories  and  a
wide range  of  possible  useful  lives  within  each  category  should  be
avoided. They  are  difficult  to  oversee  because  of the  problems  in
classifying  individual  assets. Furthermore,  they  facilitate  tax
avoidance  by giving  wide  latitude  to  companies--particularly  companies
in tax  holiday  periods--to  select  useful  lives  and  schedule  depreciation
deductions  so as to  minimize  total  taxes  paid  over  time.
One  easy  method  of depreciation  adopted  in the  Indonesia  tax
reform  is  a system  of open-ended  accounts. Under  this  system,  all
movable  assets  are  assigned  to  one  of several  (thre.:-  in the  Indonesian
case)  open-ended  accounts  based  on  useful  life. Tht ourchase  price  of
any  newly  acquired  asset  is  added  to the  value  of thb  relevant  account,
and  any  proceeds  from  sale  of a  retired  asset  are  subtracted  from  such
value. No record  of  book  value  by asset  need  be kept.21 Depreciation
is then  calculated  by applying  the  relevant  percentage  to the  total
20  For an interesting  discussion  of these  issues,  see  World  Bank,
Fiscal  Policy  and  Tax  Reform  in  Turkey,  pp. 69-73.
21  In the  case  of an extraordinary  loss,  as a result  of casualty  or
termination  of a large  segment  of the  business,  such loss  may  be fully
deducted  from  income  in  the  year it  occurs. Thus,  in this  particular
case  the  book  value  of the  relevant  assets  must  be calculated  separately
and  subtracted  from  the  amount  in the  relevant  asset  class.22
account. The 1-4  year  account  is  depreciated  at 50%,  the  4-8  year
account  at 25%,  and  the  over-8  year  account  at 10%. Buildings  make  up a
fourth  category  of assets,  and  they  are  depreciated  individually  on  a
straight-line  basis  over  20  years.
With  only three  classes  of movable  property,  problems  of
classification  of assets  are  minimized  and  calculation  of depreciation
deductions  is  simplified.  Auditing  can  concentrate  on determining  that
the  assets  included  in  the  accounts  in  fact  exist  and  are in  use,  rather
than  devoting  valuable  time  to fine  points  of asset  classification.
Furthermore,  if  at a later  point  in time  the  Indonesian  tax  system  is
indexed  for  inflation,  the  open-ended  accounts  are  easy  to index. The
only  additional  step  required  is to  multiply  their  total  value  by the
index  factor  each  year  before  depreciation  is  calculated.
Interest  Expense.
Although  interest  is  a legitimate  business  expense,22  policy
makers  should  be aware  of the  problem  of 'disguised  equity". Many
firms,  including  subsidiaries  of foreign  firms,  report  debt:equity
ratios  far  in  excess  of those  normally  viable  in firms  with  exclusively
arms-length  debt. Ratios  as  high as 5:1  or even  10:1  are  not  unheard  of
in  some  countries. Much  of the  debt,  however,  is  from  parent  companies
or other  related  parties,  and  therefore  it  substitutes  for  equity
investment. If interest  is  deductible  and  dividends  are  not (i.e.  if
22  This  assumes  that  investment  is depreciated  over  several  years
rather  than  fully  expensed  in  the  first  year.  Interest  incurred  for
personal  consumption--such  as  home  mortgage  or credit  card  interest--is
not  a  necessary  expense  for  earning  income  and  therefore  need  not  be
deductible  under  a strict  definition  of an income  tax. Mortgage
interest  deductions  are  essentially  "tax  expenditures"--government
subsidies,  in this  case  for  home ownership.23
the  business  and  personal  taxes  are  not integrated),  such  "disguised
equity"  presents  l  method  of avoiding  taxation  of distributed  earnings.
One  way to control  this  method  of tax  avoidance  is to impose
limits  on the  debt:equity  ratios  that  are  permissible  for  tax  purposes.
A ratio  as low  as 1:1  may  not  be unreasonable  for  manufacturing  firms,
while  a slightly  higher  ratio  may  be allowed  for  non-manufacturing
firms. One  single  ratio  of,  say,  2:1  woiuld  be  reasonable  for  all  firms
and  easier  to administer.  Debt  above  such  ratio  could  be reported  in
financial  statements,  but interest  on such  debt  would  not  be deductible
in  calculating  taxable  income. 23
TAX  RATES.
Residents.
The  concept  of a global  income  tax  for  residents  means  that  all
income  is  aggregated  and  a single  rate  structure  applied. Although  the
choice  of rate  structure  will  always  be influenced  by the  basic  goals  of
tax  reform,  certain  general  guidelines  are  helpful. First,  given  the
low level  of per  capita  income  and the  difficulties  of tax
administration  in  developing  countries,  the  exemption  level  (or  standard
deduction)  should  be high  enough--at  least  two  to  three  times  per  capita
income--to  exclude  the  great  majority  of individuals.  Jamaica's  income
tax  law,  reformed  in 1985,  allows  a standard  deduction  equal  to two
times  per  capita  GDP  and thereby  legally  exempts  over  80  percent  of the
23  In addition,  the  law  could  provide  authority  for  the  tax
administration  to recharacterize  debt  as equity  for  tax  purposes  if such
debt is  between  affiliated  firms. Such  provision  could  be used,  for
example,  if the  debt  had characteristics  (qucl  ns  a  nonmarket  interest
rate or an  overly  flexible  payment  schedule)  typical  of arm's-length
transactions.  Even if  not applied  much in  piac  Ace, the  mere  existence
of this  provision  would  provide  some  means  to  police  and  could  thus
inhibit  obvious  abuses  of interest  deductibility.24
population. Indonesia's  standard  deduction  is  even  more generous,
legally  exempting  over  90  percent  of the  population. In general,  the
poorer  the  country,  the  greater  the  percentage  that  should  be excluded
to satisfy  both  administrative  and  equity  concerns. As a country's  per
capita  income  grows,  the  reach  of its  income  tax  can  then  effectively
expand.
Second,  above  the  exemption  level  the  rate  structure  should  be
progressive  only  to the  extent  that  the  tax  remains  enforceable.  A
large  exemption  level  results  in  a  highly  progressive  tax incidence  in
and  of itself. Sharply  progressive  rate  structures  above  that  exemption
invite  widespread  evasion  and  avoidance  even  in the  most  advanced
countries,  and  would  be particularly  problematic  in a  country  with  more
limited  administrative  resources. In fact,  to the  extent  possible  given
the  need for  some  degree  of progressivity  on  equity  grounds,  the
marginal  tax  rate  should  be flat  over  a  wide  band  of income  for  both
middle-income  individuals  and  large  business  firms. A flat  tax  avoids
the  problems  associated  with  the  "bunching"  of income  earned  over
several  years  (such  as  capital  gains)  or  by several  persons  (such  as
family  members  combined  in  a joint  tax  return). In addition,  given  the
ease  of calculating  tax  liability  under  a flat  tax  system,  withholding
of taxes  on wage  or investment  income  can  be a  more  accurate
approximation  of final  tax  liability  than  under  a progressive  system.
Third,  tax  rates  should  be low  enough  to serve  by themselves  as a
form  of generalized  tax  incentive  for  entrepreneurial  activity  by an
individual  or firm. If a country  wants  to attract  foreign  investment,
for  example,  a relatively  low  tax  rate (on  the  order  of 30 to  40
percent)  may  well  be easier  to  understand  and  more  effective  that  a25
plethora  of investment  incentives  with a  high  underlying  tax  rate. Of
course,  this  consideration  must  be balanced  against  revenue  needs.
Recent  income  tax  reforms  have tended  to follow  the  above
prescriptions.  Jamaica's  new  income  tax  has  only  one  rate--33  1/3
percent--while  Indonesia's  new  tax  has three  rates--15,  25,  and  35
percent. The  15 and  25  percent  brackets  cover  most  middle-income
individuals  and  small  businesses,  while  the  35  percent  marginal  rate
applies  only  to  wealthy  individuals  and  most  businesses. The
Phillipines  also  recently  lowered  its  maximum  rate  from  60 to 35
percent.
Nonresidents.
Nonresidents  are  in general  taxable  only  on income  with its  source
in the  taxing  country,  and  the  tax  is  usually  collected  through
withholding  (on  interest,  dividends,  rents,  royalties,  and  payments  for
services). Nonresidents  are  not  usually  required  to file  tax  returns.
Withholding  tax  rates  are  typically  set  somewhere  between  10  and  20
percent. The  choice  of a  withholding  rate  should  be influenced  by
several  concerns.
First,  the  rate  of  withholding  on dividends  and  other  remittances
of foreign  investors  to their  parent  companies  abroad  should  ideally  be
set  so that  local  earnings  do not  bear a total  tax  significantly  in
excess  of the  home country  tax  on such  income. For  example,  if company
income  were first  taxed  at  40 percent,  and  then  a lC  percent  gross
withholding  tax  were  applied  to the  dividends  or other  profit
remittances  paid  out  of after-tax  income,  the  total  effective  tax  rate
on the  underlying  corporate  income  would  be 46 percent. Combinations  of
35/15,  30/15,  or 30/20  would  yield  total  tax  burdens  of 44.75,  40.5,  or26
44  percent,  respectively.  If the  home  country  grants  a foreign  tax
credit  for  this  amount  (as  in  the  United  States),  the  host country  might
as  well tax  up to the  home  country  rate. But  any  combination  of company
and  withholding  tax  rates  that  exceeds  the  home  country  rate  will lead
to  a real  extra  burden  that  may  discourage  foreign  investment.  If the
home  country  exempts  foreign  source  income  altogether  (as  in some
European  countries),  any  reduction  in  host  country  rates  will  be
favorable  for  the  investor.
Second,  the  rate  should  ideally  leave  some  room to  be lowered  by
treaty  in return  for  concessions  by the  treaty  partner. 24 This
consideration  would  tend  to support  a rate  somewhat  higher  than  10
percent,  itself  a common  rate  in treaties. A higher  withholding  rate
also  has the  advantage  of encouraging  retention  of  profits  in the  host
country,  particularly  when  combined  with  a  modest  underlying  rate.
Third,  the  rate  should  ideally  be the  same  for  all  types  of income
remitted  abroad  to  minimize  the  incentive  to recharacterize  payments.
For  example,  if interest  were  subject  to  a lower  rate  than  dividends,
there  would  be an even  greater  incentive  than  already  exists  (because  of
interest  deductibility)  for  a foreign  investor  to  be highly  leveraged.
Taken  together,  these  considerations  push  in the  direction  of  a
withholding  rate  of  between  12.5  and  20  percent,  depending  on the  basic
income  tax  rate  structure. The  Indonesians  impose  a  basic  rate  of 35
percent  and  a  withholding  tax  rate  of 15  percent. If the  basic  rate  is
24  For  example,  Jamaica's  33  1/3  percent  rate  of tax  "deduction  at
source"  has  been  lowered  to 10 to  15 percent  in treaties  with  several
industrial  countries. This  is  not  to say  that  developing  countries
should  consider  tax  treaties  with industrial  countries  as high  priority.
In fact,  the  benefits  to  be gained  from  such  treaties  are  often
questionable,  while  the  costs  in lower  tax  collections  can  be
significant.27
as  high as  40  percent,  a lower  withholding  rate is  called  for.  If che
basic  rate  can  be kept at 30  percent,  a rate  as high  as 20 percent  is
not  unreasonable.
INVESTMENT  TAX  INCENTIVES.
Many developing  countries  provide  generous  tax  incentives  to
investors  in  the  form  of  tax  holidays  and  investment  allowances. In
some  cases  these  incentives  are  applied  across  the  board,  while  in
others  they  are  targeted  to  certain  types  of investmenc,  such  as
investment  in  particular  locations  or sectors. They  are often  complex,
costly,  inefficient,  and  inequitable  in reaching  their  goals.
Com2lexitv  can  arise  if  a system  of tax  incentives  is 'fine-tuned'  to
fit  the incentives  ofrered  to  particular  characteristics  of an
investment  project. In such  a case  it  may  be unclear  to investors  and
government  officials  alike  just  what  incentives  are  available.  High
cost  can  arise  not  only  from  tax  revenue  legally  foregone,  but  also  from
firms'  ability  to avoid  even  more  tax  by manipulating  accounts. This  is
especially  true  in the  case  of tax  holidays. Income  can  be transferred
into  the  holiday  period  and  expenses  out  of it (whether  within  the  same
firm  or  between  related  firms),  thereby  raising  net income  in  the
holiday  period  and  reducing  it in  later  years  when taxes  are  due. Tax
incentives  can  be inequitable  if  only  large  firms  are  eligible  for  them
or if  only large  firms  have the  resources  to  wade through  cumbersome
government  procedures  to obtain  them. Finally,  tax  incentives  can  be
inefficient  if they  reward  activity  that  would  occur  anyway. For
example,  few  firms  would  relocate  to  a  backward  area  for  only  one  extra
year  of tax  holiday. In  fact,  in  many  cases  tax  incentives  have little28
if  any impact  on the  decision  to invest. Empirical  research  on foreign
investment  indicates  that  tax  incentives  are  less  important  to  most
potential  investors  than  other  characteristics  of the  host country,  such
as  political  stability,  market  size,  economic  growth  potential,
production  costs,  and the  general  policy  environment.
Before  offering  tax  incentives,  countries  are  well-advised  to
reduce  domestic  distortions  and  encourage  investment  in  other  ways,  such
as correcting  overvalued  exchange  rates  or investing  in  needed
infrastructure.  If incentives  must  be offered,  investment  allowances
are  preferable  to  tax  holidays. They  are  relatively  easy to  understand
and implement,  and  they  provide  less  scope  for  abuse. Their  economic
impact  is to lower  the  marginal  effective  tax  rate  ("METR")  on  new
investment.  At the  extreme,  a 100  percent  investment  allowance  (full
expensing)  reduces  the  METR to  zero.
INDEXING  FOR  INFLATION.
High levels  of inflation  can  lead  to significant  distortions  if
the  calculation  of taxable  income  is  based  on historic  costs  alone.
Historic-cost  depreciation  understates  investment  costs,  leading  to an
overstatement  of taxable  income. On the  other  hand,  fixed  nominal
interest  overstates  the  cost  of capital  in inflationary  times;  the
inflation  component  is in effect  a payment  of  principal,  while  only  the
"real"  component  is  a true  cost.  Allowing  full  deduction  of nominal
interest  provides  highly-leveraged  firms  with a  very effective  means  to
understate  taxable  income. Indexing  the  tax  base for  inflation  involves
adjusting  four  accounting  items--depreciation,  interest,  inventories,
and  capital  gains--to  remove  the  effect  of changes  in  the  general  price29
level  from  the  calculation  of taxable  income. 25 Although  helpful  in
correcting  for  distortions  in  the  measurement  of income,  indexing  does
add  to the  complexity  of an income  tax. As a rough  rule  of thumb,
indexing  is  probably  not  worth  the  trouble  if inflation  is  low--say,
less  than  ten  percent  per  year.  If inflation  is  over  20 percent  per
year,  indexing  is  probably  much  more important. In  between,  the
decision  should  rest  on an assessment  of administrative  capacity.
Whether  or  not the  tax  base is indexed,  absolute  amounts  fixed  by
the tax  law--such  as tax  brackets,  personal  exemptions,  and  penalties
for  noncompliance--can  quite  easily  be indexed  through  regular
adjustment. Indexing  of  penalties  is  particularly  important  to prevent
their  becoming  obsolete. 26
THE TAX TREATMENT  OF THE FAMILY.
Personal  exemptions  for  individuals  provide  a  method  of  excluding
those  with low  income  from  the  income  tax  net. Most countries  allow
personal  exemptions  for  each  member  of a family  in order  to take  into
account  the  larger  expenses  of larger  families. 27 As noted  earlier,
setting  relatively  high  personal  exemption  levels--on  the  order  of two
25  A simple  and  accurate  method  of indexing  involves  the  following
three  steps. First,  all  real  assets  (primarily  depreciable  assets  and
inventory)  are  written  up  by the  index  factor,  and  this  amount  is
included  in  profit  on the  income  statement. Second,  all  real
liabilities  (owners'  equity)  are  written  up  by the  index  factor,  and
this  amount  is subtracted  from  profit  on the  income  statement. The  net
effect  of these  two  steps  is  to add  back into  income  the  pure inflation
element  of interest  deductions  taken  on debt  used  to finance  purchases
of real  assets. Third,  depreciation  is calculated  on the  written-up
value  of depreciable  assets  (Harberger,  1982). For  a discussion  of
indexing  methods,  see  World  Bank (1987),  pp. 74-77.
26  Penalty  clauses  in the  old  Indonesian  tax  laws  typically  called  for
"'six  months  in  jail  or a fine  of 600  rupiah  [less  than  U.S.$1]"!
27  Exemptions  for  children  are  sometimes  lower  than  exemptions  for
adults. Some  countries  limit  the  number  of children  for  whom  exemptions
can  be taken  in  order  to support  a trend  toward  smaller  families.30
to three  times  per  capita  GDP--is  an excellent  way  both  to insure
progressivity  in tax  burden  and  to concentrate  scarce  administrative
resources  on firms  and  high-income  individuals.  However,  deciding  on
the  structure  of  personal  exemptions--that  is,  the  tax  treatment  of the
family  as a unit--can  involve  some  difficult  tradeoffs.
The  following  concerns  are  generally  considered  in designing  the
exact  structure  of personal  exemptions,  tax  rates,  and  filing
requirements  of  various  members  of a family:
a.  Incentives  for  work:  Ideally  the  system  should  create  no
disincentives  to  additional  work;  i.e.  no one  should  be worse  off
after-tax  by earning  more income  before-tax.
b.  Incentives  for  marriage: Ideally  there  should  be no tax
penalty  for  marriage,  i.e.  the  tax  burden  on two  persons  should
not rise  automatically  simply  because  they  marry.
c.  Equal  tax  for  equal  income: Two  families  of the  same  size
with the  same  income  should  ideally  pay  the  same  tax,  no matter
who earns  the  income.
d.  Ease  of  withholding: Employer  withholding  should  be kept  as
simple  as  possible  and  should  constitute  the  final  tax  payment  for
employees  who  earn  no outside  income.
Although  everyone  can  agree  on these  goals,  it is difficult  to
satisfy  them  all  simultaneously  if  the  tax  rate  structure  is  at all
progressive  and  personal  exemptions  are  given  for  dependents. If each
spouse  in  a family  files  and  pays tax  separately,  there  will  be no
"marriage  penalty"  and  no 'work  penalty",  but they  together  will  pay
less  tax  than  one-earner  families  with  equal  income  if they  each  get the
benefit  of exemptions  for  dependents  and lower  rate  brackets. If each
family  must consolidate  income  and  file  one  joint  return,  families  of
equal  size  with  equal  income  will  pay  equal  taxes. However,  two  working
married  individuals  will  be taxed  heavier  than  two  single  individuals
with  comparable  incomes  to the  extent  the  consolidation  pushes  the31
former  into  a  higher  tax  bracket. Furthermore,  withholding  cannot  be
final  because  an  employer  has  no way  of knowing  the  income  of an
employee's  spouse.
Given  administrative  constraints,  a developing  country  may  want to
opt for  a structure  of  personal  exemptions  and  tax  rates  that  is  easy  to
administer  through  withholding. Such  a system  would  minimize  the  extent
of  progressivity  in  the  tax  rate  structure  and  would  allow  full  personal
exemptions  (and  the  full  benefit  of any  lower  rate  brackets)  to each
spouse  if  both  work.28 (If  it is  possible  to implement  effectively,
only  one  spouse  should  be allowed  to  claim  deductions  for  dependents.)
Given  no  outside  income,  employer  tax  withholding  could  then  constitute
the  final  tax  payment  by a couple,  and  they  would  not  be required  to
file  individual  tax  ret.irns.  Such  a system  would  also  avoid  any  work  or
marriage  penalty. The  only  disadvantage  would  be that  families  with
only  one  earner  might  pay  more tax (to  the  extent  effective  rates  are
progressive)  than  families  with two  earners  and  the  same  total  gross
income.
ADMINISTRATIVE  PROCEDURES.
Tax  reform  in developing  countries  should  be concerned  not  only
with substantive  provisions  of tax  design,  but  also  with the  procedures
by which  taxpayers  meet their  tax  liabilities  and  the  administrative
structure  within  which  tax  officials  carry  out  their  responsibility.
Indeed,  given  the  low  level  of tax  compliance  in  most  developing
count ;es,  improvements  in  procedures  and  administratLon  are  critical  to
28  Such  a rule  was  adopted  in  both  Jamaica  and  Indonesia.32
the  success  of any  substantive  reform. Some  important  procedural  issues
are  discussed  Llow.
Withholding  Mechanisms.
Withholding  of tax  at the  source  is an  extremely  important  tool  of
tax  administration,  particularly  in  developing  countries  where
enforcement  after-the-fact  is  hampered  by a shortage  of administrative
resources. As with  other  aspects  of tax  design,  withholding  mechanisms
should  be as simple  as possible.
Employment  income.
Withholding  of income  tax  on  employees  is an indispensable  tool
for  collecting  income  tax  revenues. Both  Jamaica  and Indonesia  collect
over  90  percent  of personal  income  taxes  through  withholding. Employers
should  be required  to  withhold  income  tax  on all  payments  to  employees
of  wages,  salaries,  and  honoraria,  in  whatever  form. Withholding  should
also  be required  on payouts  of  pension  benefits  by pension  funds,
provided  that  the  contributions  were  tax-deductible.
Care should  be taken  to insure  that  the  withholding  tax  is  not
simply  a gross  payroll  tax. This  requires  that  the  tax  be personalized-
-that  the  amount  to  be withheld  be calculated  separately  for  each
employee  by applying  the  general  tax  rate  schedule  taking  into  account
the  personal  exemptions  for  which  that  employee  is  eligible. Employers
should  be required  to supply  the  tax  department  with  a record  of taxes
withheld  for  each individual  employee  and  to inform  such  employee  of the
amount  withheld. Making  an employee  aware  that  taxes  are  being  paid  on
his or  her  behalf  can  be an important  first  step  in introducing  that
employee  to a system  of personal  income  taxation. As discussed  above,33
with simple  rules  regarding  the tax  treatment  of the  family,  withholding
can  be final  unless  the  employee  earns  significant  outside  income.
Capital  income.
Withholding  is  also a convenienit  way to  collect  tax  on many types
of income  from  capital,  including  interest,  dividends,  rents,  and
royalties. This is  particularly  true  for income  paid to  nonresidents,
because  of the inability  to enforce  their  taxpaying  obligations  any
other  way.  Virtually  all  countries  impose  withholding  taxes  on capital
income  paid to  nonresidents.
In the  case of domestic  payments,  the  recipient  must file  a tax
return,  and there  is thus  less  need to  require  withholding. However,  if
the  payer is  a large  organization  making  regular  payments  of interest,
dividends,  rents,  or royalties,  such  as a  bank or a large  firm,
withholding  at a rate  of 10%  or 15% (later  creditable  by the  recipient
against  final  income  tax  due)  can  lead  to greater  tax  compliance  without
an unreasonable  administrative  burden. 29  Extending  the  withholding
requirement  to all  payers  of such forms  of income,  including
individuals,  however,  would  complicate  its  administration  and  weaken  its
enforceability.
Current  Payment  (P.A.Y.E.)  System,
Aside  from  being  subject  to  withholding  by other  parties,
taxpayers  in any  country  should  be required  to  make estimated  payments
of taxes  during  a  year both to speed  up tax  collections  and to lessen
the  burden  of one large  lump-sum  payment  at the  end  of the  year.  Such
payments  can  be monthly  or quarterly. Perhaps  the  easiest  way to
29  For  example,  Thailand,  Pakistan,  Turkey,  Indonesia,  and  Korea  are
examples  of countries  that  tax  domestic  interest  income  through
withholding. Indonesia  also imposes  analogous  withholding  requirements
on other  types  of capital  income.34
calculate  the  amount  due  is as a fraction  (one-twelfth  or one  quarter)
of the  previous  year's  tax  liability. Although  such  a  method  of
calculation  is  not as  accurate  as one  based  on current  records,  it is
easy  to apply  in  a country  where  reliable  records  are  often  nonexistent,
and  it is  preferable  to  a system  based  exclusively  on gross  turnover.
As accounting  and  auditing  standards  improve,  a  more accurate  system  of
estimation  can  be used,  accompanied  by fines  for  underpayment.
Self-  vs.  official  assessment.
Given  administrative  constraints,  one  goal  of tax  reform  in
developing  countries  should  be to  place  more  responsibility  on the
taxpayer  (or  tax  withholder).  A move from  a system  of official
assessment  of all taxpayers  by tax  authorities  to  a system  of self-
assessment  is  one  way to further  this  goal. Under  a self-assessment
system,  taxpayers  are  legally  required  to obtain  and  file  a tax  return,
and  official  assessments  are  issued  only if  a taxpayer  fails  to file  a
return,  if an audit  concludes  that  tax  was  underpaid  or a refund  wrongly
given,  or if the  taxpayer  does  not  keep  books  and  records  that  are
adequate  for  calculating  the  amount  of tax  due.
Such  a move to  self-assessment  can  address  several  administrative
problems  simultaneously.  First,  it  can  reduce  the  number  of cases  that
tax  officials  must  address  each  year,  leaving  more time  to  study  each
case  more  carefully. 30 If strong  penalties  are  imposed  when  wrongdoing
is found  in  a few  cases,  the  example  should  have a deterrent  effect  on
other  taxpayers. In  addition,  the  move  toward  self-assessment  reduces
30  For  example,  Pakistan  recently  implemented  a simple  self-assessment
procedure  for  individual  tax  payers  with income  less  than  Rs. 100,000.
This  allows  tax  authorities  to  concentrate  their  auditing  efforts  on a
smaller  number  of taxpayers  (approximately  30,000)  who  account  for  90
percent  of total  income  tax  receipts. World  Bank (1989),  pp 42-43.35
the  contacts  between  taxpayers  and  tax  officials,  thereby  reducing  the
opportunities  for  collusion  between  them. A taxpayer  is  no longer
forced  to  depend  on the issuance  of a tax  assessment  to  determine  his
final  tax  liability.  and the  possibility  of "bargaining"  exists  only if
the  taxpayer  is  chosen  for  audit.
The  success  of a tax  regime  based  on self-assessment  depends
critically  on  a well-managed  system  of audit. The  choice  of  cases  to  be
audited  must  be out  of the  hands  of the  auditors  themselves,  and  each
audit  must  be conducted  thoroughly,  with  appropriate  santctions  applied
in full  and  publicized  to  create  a deterrent  effect. Developing  such  an
audit  system  should  be a  primary  goal  of tax  administrations  in
developing  countries.
Refunds.
For  any  tax  system  to  be respected  by the  public,  it  must  provide
for  dependable  refunds  in cases  where  taxes  are  overpaid. Such
overpayments  are  common  if income  tax  is  withheld  by third  parties. 31
The  ability  to  obtain  a timely  refund  of any  excess  payment  will greatly
enhance  the  willingness  of a taxpayer  to  comply  with the  tax  laws.
Operation  of a tax  refund  system  has proven,  however,  to  be
difficult  in  many  countries. Given  budget  constraints  and  the
difficulty  of raising  revenues,  officials  are  understandably  hesitant  to
return  amounts  already  collected. Furthermore,  as  with  any  mechanism
for  distributing  public  funds,  the  power  over  tax  refunds  can  be misused
by the  officials  in  charge  for  personal  gain.  Refunds  may  be difficult
31  The  need for  refunds  is  also  likely  to  arise  under  a  VAT, if  VAT is
payable  on the  purchase  of  capital  goods  or inventory  by a  new  or
expanding  business.36
to  obtain  without  making  significant  side  payments  to those  in control
of the  refund  process.
As with  so  many issues  involving  tax  reform  in  developing
countries,  decisions  on refund  procedures  must  strike  a  balance  between
the  needs  of taxpayers  and  the  capacity  of the  tax  administration.
Refunds  should  be availab'le,  but  tax  authorities  may  want to audit
refund  requests  more stringently  than  other  documents. Interest  should
be payable  on refunds  if they  are  not  made  quickly;  the  government  may
want to set  some  period  after  which  interest  will  accrue.
Enforcement  mechanisms.
Improving  compliance  with tax  laws  will depend  in  part  on the
ability  of tax  administrations  in  developing  countries  to increase  the
effectiveness  of enforcement  mechanisms. The  first  line  of enforcement
is the  imposition  of interest  and  monetary  penalties  for  late  or  non-
payment. The interest  rate  should  be adjustable  and  should  always  match
or exceed  the  market  rate  to  eliminate  any  monetary  benefit  from  delay.
Setting  monetary  penalties  can  be difficult;  they  need to  be large
enough  to  provide  some  deterrence  but  not  so large  that  tax  officials
would  hesitate  to apply  them  in  practice. Late  payments  should  be
subject  to  a penalty  (in  addition  to interest)  of a certain  percentage
of the  amount  owed (in  the  range  of 2-5  percent)  per  month.  Larger
penalties  (again  calculated  as a  percentage  of amount  owed)  should  apply
if a tax  return  is  not  filed  at all  or if  adequate  books  are  not
maintained  and  produced  upon  audit.
If  monetary  penalties  do  not induce  compliance,  the  second  line  of
enforcement  is the  seizure  and  auction  of property. While  this  is  a
very imporrant  tool  for  tax  enforcement,  tax  authorities  may  be hesitant37
to  use it if  they  question  the  quality  and/or  legitimacy  of the  tax
assessment  being  enforced. Strengthening  collection  mechanisms  must  go
hand in  hand  with strengthening  administrative  procedures  as a  whole.
The last  line  of enforcement  is criminal  penalties. The threat  of
prison  is  certainly  a strong  inducement  to  pay taxes;  however,  countries
vary in  their  willingness  to send  tax  evaders  to jail. Each  country
must  make this  decision  individually,  considering  the  cultural  and  legal
norms  of the  community.
Obiections  and  ARpeals.
Any tax  system  needs  avenues  for  taxpayers  to  air  grievances  and
objections  to  official  action  in  order  to  offset  the  power  of tax
officials  to  collect  taxes  through  seizure  of  property  and  other
enforcement  action. In general  it is  a good  idea  to  have  a hierarchy  of
appeals  mechanisms  under  which  a taxpayer  has to submit  a dispute  to
internal  review  by the  tax  administration  before  proceeding  to
independent  review  by the  courts. Given  the  complexity  of many  tax
issues,  an independent  tax  court--such  as exists  in  Mexico--may  be a
better  avenue  for  external  raview  than  more general  courts. In any
case,  the  integrity  of the  review  process--and  of the  tax  system  more
generally--will  be preserved  only if  each  level  of  review  is  subject  to
time  limits,  if cases  are  handled  objectively,  honestly,  and
professionally,  and if  the  government  must  pay interest  on awards  won  by
a taxpayer. The integrity  is further  safeguarded,  and  the  educational
function  of the  review  process  is enhanced,  if  external  appeal  decisions
are  published  and  widely  distributed.  Without  such integrity,  taxpayers
with  large  amounts  at stake  will  avoid  official  complaint  mechanisms  and38
opt  f)r  using  whatever  channels  of influence  might  be available,  thus
heightening  the  'bargaining'  element  in tax  administration.
One  difficult  issue  that  must  be faced  in  setting  policies
regarding  objections  and  appeals  is the  question  of  how  much  of a
contested  assessment  must  be paid  before  an objection  or appeal  is
accepted  for  review. Requiring  that  100  percent  of an  assessment  be
paid  can  undermf.e  the  usefulness  of the  appeal  process,  particularly  if
corruption  is  a  problem. If official  assessments  are  unreasonably
excessive,  the  costs  of  paying  and  waiting  for  later  relief  may  be so
high that  taxpayers  prefer  to 'negotiate'  before  assessments  are  issued.
On the  other  hand,  waiving  any  requirement  to  pay  might  cause  frivolous
objections  to  proliferate  simply  as  a device  to delay  payment  of tax
legally  due.  Some  intermediate  solutions  might  iaLvolve  requiring
partial  payment  or  payment  into  an escrow  account.
Books  and  records.
A  major  impediment  to income  tax  administration  and  enforcement  in
developing  countries  is the  failure  by many taxpayers  to maintain  and
submit  books  and  records  that  are  accurate  and  adequate  to  calculate  tax
due. The  majority  of taxpayers  are likely  to  be small  and  not  well-
trained  in  modern  accounting  techniques,  and  many  of those  taxpayers  who
are  sophisticated  enough  to  keep  complete  books  try  to  avoid  revealing
them  to taxpayers. It is  often  said  that  taxpayers  keep three  sets  of
books--one  for  the  tax  office  (showing  low  profits),  one  for  the  banks
(showing  high  profits),  and  one  for  the  ow  Lers  (showing  actual  profits).
A system  of 'presumptive'  taxation  for  small  taxpayers,  as
described  earlier,  can  avoid  some  of the  problems  associated  with the
keeping  of  books  arl  records. Under  such  a system  a taxpayer  need  keep39
only  a record  of gross  turnover;  industry-specific  norms  are then
applied  to  determine  taxable  income. For  most taxpayers,  however,  there
is no  way to avoid  the  need  for  complete  books  of account,  including
records  of cash  and  bank transactions,  accounts  receivable  and  payable.
and  inventory,  as well  as  balance  sheets  and  income  statements  drawn  up
at the  close  of  each taxable  year.  Strict  penalties  used  to  be applied
when taxpayers  fail  to submit  books  when  required  or produce  falsified
books  or records. Adequate  bookkeeping  is  the  foundation  upon  which
income  taxation  rests; without  it,  sophisticated  tax  policy  analysis
and  reforms  in laws  and  procedures  can  only  be of limited  value.*
This  paper  has  summarized  the  major  issues  typically  faced  in
reforming  income  taxes  in developing  countries. More  revenue,  increased
efficiency,  and  a better  distribution  of the  tax  burden  are  usually  the
underlying  goals. Improving  enforcement  and  compliance  by simplifying
the  tax  structure  and  increasing  the  legitimacy  of the  tax  procesc  iv
usually  the  major  challenge.40
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